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RATIONALISM IN NORMATIVE BUDGET THEORY 
Dan Williams 
Baruch College 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper concerns epistemological rationalism and the norms used by governments to instruct their office~s 
to perform their duties. The particular duty I discuss here is preparation of and action on the budget. In th~s 
paper I use "rationalism" as the opposite of "empiricism." This rationalism does not refer to "'econonuc 
rationality," it refers to the method of attaining knowledge associated with introspection, logic, and a priori 
knowledge. It is opposed to the method of attaining knowledge associated \Vith observation, experiment, and 
evidence. 
By "norms,,. ·'normative" and other related terms, I mean action guiding language. Four senses of normative 
are defined later in this paper. Government officers find much of what they do specified or limited by action 
guiding language. Much of this language is narrow and technical in nature, consisting of regulations, SOP's, 
manuals, precedents, and performance plans. These norms arc often concrete and specific. This paper 
examines where such norms fit in the landscape of rationalism and empiricism, and identifies a source of 
confusion that can lead to poorly constructed norms. A model of thinking is developed. 
The model is then applied to budget norms, that is to the processes, formats, and techniques urged on, or 
demanded of, budget participants, primarily those who put the budget together. There is a question to resolve: 
Is the process of formulating budget guidelines empirical or rationalistic? 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS NORMATIVE GUIDELINES 
Public administrators often concern themselves with matters of technique such as how to make budgets, how 
to measure perfonnancc, how to manage organizations, how to hire and supervise, how to conduct themselves 
in the political arena, how to privatize their functions, and so forth. Both popular and academic literature 
overflow '"ith material advising public administrators on these matters. Some, perhaps most, of what goes into 
a MPA program focuses on these matters. This paper concerns \Vhat constitutes good technique, or, more 
precisely. how we should come to attain the knowledge that constitutes these techniques. In particular, hO\v 
should we formulate the guidelines for administrative practice? I begin by examining two epistemological 
dichotomies. 
RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM 
It is widely held that two dominant ways of attaining knowledge are rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism 
is typified by Rene Descartes' approach in Meditation on First Philosophy (1642). where he doubts everything 
that he can, finally settling on one indubitable fact, ·'I think... In the process of doubting, he chooses to trust 
his reason over the observations of his senses. Empiricism is typified by John Locke's approach in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding ( 1690), in which he denies the existence of "innate ideas." consequently 
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observations of the senses are the only true source of knowledge. Modem thought, dating to Immanuel Kant, 
denies that lmowledge comes from either pure rationalism or pure empiricism, instead thinking is constrained 
by observations while observations are constrained by the observer's predisposition to observe. Still, there are 
methods of obtaining lmowledge that are more empirical and methods of obtaining lmowledge that arc more 
rationalistic. The method of ex-perimentation in the sciences is proffered as an example of a primarily empirical 
method, while the introspective approach of mathematics is primarily rationalistic. For the purposes of this 
paper, I use rationalism and empiricism as ideal types that may help us focus our attention on the matter of how 
we learn what we lmow. 
It is widely believed that the current era is dominated by empiricism, that is, that in the debate between the 
adherents of Locke the adherents of Descartes, Locke's forces \von. This view is closely associated \vith the 
methods of science. Empirical investigation, in the form of an experin1ent, is viewed as the paradigm of finding 
out about the world. Although this view has come under attack since the l 950's. it still holds up fairly well. 
For example, within the fields closely associated with public administration, research design is taught as quas1-
experimentation. Factual matters are not believed to be discoverable through introspection. 
"KNOWING THAT" AND "KNOWING HOW" 
Our second dichotomy is between '"knowing that" and '·knowing how'' (Ryle, 1949). Over most of the 
twentieth century, British-American epistemology has been concerned with what is true and how we come to 
know it. These are concerns about .. !mowing that." Science is \\idely thought to be a study of facts and 
theories that explain such facts. So, the enterprise of science is a study of '"!mowing that." It is widely held 
that lmowledgc consists of having justified true beliefs, which amounts to believing true propositions for good 
reasons . 
.. Know how" (technical knowledge) 1 is different from factual knowledge. Claims of fact are true or false, \vays 
of doing are effective or ineffective. While facts have a certain exclusivity to them - the same proposition 
cannot be both true and false in the same respect at the same time - it is less clear that ways of doing arc so 
exclusive, for example, two routes may take you to the san1e destination in about the same time. Another 
important difference is that technical knowledge is implicitly teleological (goal oriented) while factual 
knowledge is not. One knows how to achieve an end. Without the end, there is nothing to know. Whatever 
the method, technique, skill, behavior, or way of doing. it is not a ··how·· unless there is an objective. 
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PRESCRIPTIVES 
"Know how" is stored and transmitted through prescriptivcs.2 Recipes arc prescriptives for cooks. Algorithms 
arc prescriptivcs for computer programmers or mathematicians. Rules are prescriptives for game players. 
Laws are prescriptives for government officers. \Vhcn we buy complicated toys for our children, they come 
'"ith instructions for assembly. Sophisticated technical knowledge takes the fonn of prescriptive theories, that 
is. complex sets of logically connected prescriptives. 
Prcscriptivcs arc the basic components of normative language. 3 Four nom1ative uses of prescriptives are: 
Normative1 (moral norms): Prescriptives can communicate moral guidance. Kant refers to the chief guiding 
principal of morality as the '"categorical imperative," by which he means that such a prescriptive is to be 
followed unconditionally. He reserves this status to the highest level of moral precepts; hO\vevcr, a somewhat 
looser use would include not only the highest precept. but also any lesser precepts that could be derived from 
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it. 4 
Nonnativ~ (technical norms): Prescriptives can communicate technical knowledge. This is the use we have 
already noted. In Kantian terms prescriptives in this use are "hypothetical imperatives,'' that is, prescriptives 
to be followed in some circumstances. The chief condition of this form of prescriptive is that one desires the 
promised end product. 
Nonnativ~ (stipulative norms): Prescriptives can stipulate a definition by specifying a series of steps that lead 
to the intended object or condition. These stipulative prescriptives also produce a sort of technical knowledge; 
however, its benefit, to the degree that it has any, follows from the benefit of the object defined. This is another 
form of hypothetical imperative: ''If you want play a game of chess, begin with a board that is marked of in 
eight rows and eight columns of alternating colored squares .... •· 
Nonnative4 (commands): Prescriptives can be used to communicate commands. Commands are interesting 
with respect to their status as '·categorical" or '·hypothetical." Certainly Kant would call such imperatives 
hypothetical. Yet, the person issuing the command is likely expecting the command recipient to treat them as 
unconditional, and the command recipient may well view it as such. 
Prcscriptives that are purely moral (normative1), stipulative (normative3), or commands (normative4) are not 
empirical statements. They provide action guidance founded in morality or the motivations of the prescriber.5 
On the other hand technical prescriptives (normativ~) require an empirical foundation. They communicate 
pragmatic information about the world. How do they do this? 
Why can a bicycle manufacturer produce a set of diagrams and instructions that lead to the product. a bicycle, 
without first trying to put a bicycle together and find out what is needed? The reason is that the design of the 
bicycle predates the fabrication of the components. The components are fabricated to comply with the plan 
that includes the intent to assemble them in a certain manner. The plan of assemblage defines the components, 
so it is not surprising that the plan describes how the fabricated components arc assembled. Still, there are 
three areas where the plan may be empirical tested. First, there must be possibility of fabricating what is 
planned, materials must be available. Leonardo da Vinci designed many machines that were useless in his mm 
era because they required materials that \Vere unavailable. Second, the design is subject to unforeseen failure. 
Perhaps a bolt is placed where it cannot be turned. Perhaps actual assemblage is impossible because of 
practical failures, such as the need to simultaneously hold a tire in position and tighten the bolts on its axle. 
Third, the design is subject to failure of usefulness. Perhaps it has square tires, is too small or too big. or has 
such an uncomfortable seat that most users come to detest it. Perhaps the materials and fabrication make it 
too expensive to attract a market. 
These technical prescriptivcs involve a conundrum. As they arc teleological, they depend on thinking, planning. 
logical analysis, etc., in summary, rationalism. Yet they also depends on feasibility in components, process 
and cost. that is empiricism. Somehow the rationalism and empiricism of design must be coordinated. How 
do prescriptives coordinate empirical foundations \\ith rationalistic planning?6 There are two ways. First, let 
us conceive of designing - that is, formulating prescriptives - as an application of deductive logic. Empirical 
knowledge is not found in the logical construction, instead it is found in the premises - that is, the assumptions 
that are included in the plans. For example, through prior knowledge of mechanics, materials and the market 
the designer can design a bicycle yet remain constrained by the observable world. Second, the design can be 
improved through experience. Once designed. the design is implemented and results produced or, where the 
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design is too severely flawed, the results are not produced. Through observation of the implementation and 
results, flaws and opportunities for enhancement can be identified. This information is used for redesign. 
Minor fla,vs or straightforward enhancements can be dealt with in implementation. Through an iterative 
process of design, implementation, observation and redesign the prescriptives that store this technical 
knowledge can be improved over time. 
AMBIGUITY IN PRESCRIPTIVES 
An important class of prescriptives are those that are normative in more than one way at the same time. For 
example, all math is stipulative ; however, applied math is also technical. Prescriptives for applied math must 
be formulated to comply with more limitations than those for basic math. Applied mathematicians can be 
completely correct in their rationalism and attain accepted results from the perspective of defining a logical 
process. and yet remain ineffective, thus useless from the view of techniques. 
A MODEL OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 
Technical knowledge differs from factual knO\vledge. Factual knowledge consists of justified true beliefs of 
propositions. Technical knowledge consists of endorsing prescriptives that lead to anticipated objectives.7 
Experience is included in technical knowledge either through constraints on prcscriptives - that which is not 
possible is not prescribed - or through iterative adjustment through application of technique. Although 
technical knowledge is communicated through prescriptivcs, prescriptives may be used for other normative 
purposes. Prescriptives that are formulated correctly for one nom1ative purpose, may be poorly formulated for 
another. Sometimes the technical use of prescriptives overlaps other uses, which can lead to ambiguity. 
APPL YING THE MODEL TO BUDGET GUIDELINES 
Budget guidelines are prescriptives issued to budgeteers (analysts, decision makers and other participants) to 
guide development and action on a budget. They are stipulative norms, that is stipulations of actions to 
produce a product, an allocation of resources known variously as a budget or an appropriation. They also 
stipulate the production of other interim products and even some of the interactions that go on while the 
product is under production. 
Budget guidelines may also be technical, collectively a repositoiy of "'know how·· concerning budget making. 
If so, the budgets arc not simply the results of following budget guidelines, they a practical objects in the world. 
They can be useful, fail to be useful, or be less useful than one would prefer. The generation of budget 
instructions would be empirically founded, with the possibilities in the world limiting what can be prescribed. 
The iterative construction of budgets within the guidelines would gradually improve the instructions themselves. 
8 Budget guidelines that arc stipulative norms reflect rationalism and those that are technical reflect 
empiricism. 
It is apparent that the budget instructions are practical in nature. They do not describe a mere possible product, 
they describe one that is of some use, resulting in some objective. As with bicycles, budget designs can fail 
in several ways: ( 1) They can assume the availability of components that are not available. A current example 
may be Activity Based Budgeting, which depends on the assumption that governments have reliable cost 
accounting systems. (2) They can require procedures that cannot be executed, zero based budgeting is 
sometimes criticiz.ed in this manner. (3) They can produce products that no one wants. or that are not deemed 
worth the cost. Wildavsky (196 l) and others have criticiz.ed the idea of budget analysis as producing the \\>Tong 
product. 
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Budget guidelines should be empirically grounded through the assumptions they rely upon and through their 
iterative use and redesign. It is not enough to say, "I have thought up this new way to make a budget .... " That 
is the way of rationalism. Budget guidelines made in such a manner are stipulative norms. They define a 
product which is merely the result of specified steps. Such guidelines are easy enough to make, but they have 
no practical value. Some may be utterly inlpossible to follow, like finding a winning strategy when you start 
second in tic-tac-toe against an experienced player. Others, \vhile possible, arc \VOrthless, like deficit reduction 
plans that abolish the military budget or end Medicare. 
How do budget guidelines fare? Are they rationalistic, prin1arily the product of the introspection and logic of 
their designers, or arc they empirically grounded? Does the answer to this question help explain why some 
budgetary innovations take hold and spread while others fail? How can we tell one from the other? 
There are several bits of evidence that can be offered in answering these questions. First, there are elements 
of the history of budgeting which appear to reflect iterative redesign. Over the twentieth century budgeting 
has undergone numerous reforms. One series of these reforms includes: centralized budgeting ( 1921 ). 
executive budgeting (193 7), performance measurement ( 1943 ), functional budgeting ( 1949), performance 
budgeting (1949), Planning Programming Budget Systems ( 1965), zero based budgeting (1977), and the 
Government Performance and Results Act (1993). Axelrod (1995) cites 15 reforms in this series. The very 
existence of this series suggests a macro-level design - redesign approach to budgeting. Another series, is the 
Budget Accounting Act of 1921, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Granlm-Rudrnan-Hollings (1985), 
and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. While the first series focuses on budget the infommtion available 
in the budget documents, the second focuses on the roles of various decision makers and what is pemlissible 
throughout the process. Again, the mere existence of this series supports the idea that budgeting is empirically 
grounded. Unsatisfactory budget products, presumably the allocation decisions, lead to redesign and re-
implementation. Iteratively, budget guidelines are tested in the empirical world and modified to overcome 
failures or to achieve enhancements. 
What about specific budget innovations, such as ZBB or PPBS? With a multiplicity of such innovations, our 
observations may not coalesce. Still, a few examples may clarify matters. 
Pyhrr (l 976) says that zero based budgeting developed over a period of time while he was employed at Texas 
Instruments. It was developed as an alternative to incremental budgeting. However, it is not clear whether this 
S\vitch to zero based budgeting developed over time or came about suddenly \Vhen dissatisfaction with the 
previous method became pronounced. This evidence is not clear, the idea of development suggests an iterative 
process and the transfer of a working budget model from one environment to another also suggests empirical 
grounding. Anthony (1977), however, questions whether Pyhrr implemented a working model of zero based 
budgeting on a large scale and suggests that Pyhrr is closer to a sincere enthusiast \\itb an idea. This picture 
looks more like rationalism. The actual development of ZBB - the switch from zero baselines to 80% baselines 
with incremental decision packages - demonstrates an ability for the innovation to adjust through iterative trial. 
Ammons ( 1995) points out that performance measurement was first proposed by Clarence Ridley and Herbert 
Simon in 1943. Performance measurement is not strictly a budget innovation, but it is often associated with 
budgeting both as a management strategy and as production of information that can lead to decisions. Alan 
Ehrenhalt ( 1994) points out that perfom1ance budgeting, PPBS, ZBB and management by objectives all 
embrace very similar ideas and says, 'The concept never change much, but every time it received a new name, 
it got a public relations booster shot that kept it alive that much longer." His central thesis is that these types 
of approaches to policy making in the budgetary contex-r are incapable of handling the sorts of problems that 
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governments must resolve. This presents another picture of rationalism, enthusiasts with an idea (or with ideas) 
impervious to the effects of experience. 
This discussion is too limited to draw conclusions. Yet it is suggests questions. Is budget innovation an 
iterative process of design, implementation and adjustment? Or, is it the battering of rationalistic enthusiasts 
against unbending reality? Let us suppose that it is the latter. Does that suggest any changes in how budget 
prescriptives should be developed? On a broader leveL does the theory of technical knowledge sketched out 
in this paper fit with the role of prescriptives in storing and communicating technical knowledge? If so, can 
this model be used to better understand how to develop technical knO\vledge as it is used by governmental 
organizations? 
NOTES 
1. This use of technical is consistent with ordinary usage, although it c:dends it somewhat. However, the 
implication is that know how or, at least, sophisticated know how is technology. This view differs 
somewhat from the way "technology" is used in mainstream philosophy of technology, which is more 
concerned \',ith the embodied or e:-..'tended technical object (Ihde, 1991 ). 
2. ·'Prescriptive" is used here to mean a statement that prescribes or demands action. Closely related terms 
include ·'prescriptives," "imperatives," "instructions," ·'commands," '·rules," '·guidelines," '·recipes," etc. 
3. "Normative" is used here in the broadest sense of action guiding. This encompasses not only moral or 
social norms, but also other guidance that is less momentous. However, the term is not used in the 
broadest possible use, which includes non-action guiding descriptive statistics. 
4. Strictly, if the derived prescriptive follows anal)'tically from the highest moral precept, it would remain part 
of the '·categorical" imperative, otherwise it \vould be a hypothetical imperative, probably fitting the 
description of technical nom1s. 
5. This paper does not concern the epistemological status of prescriptives that are moral norms or commands. 
Prescriptives that arc stipulative norms reflect rationalism. 
6. This problem is an interesting parallel to the finding that ''ought" cannot be derived from '·is" (G. E. 
Moore, 1903; David Hume, 1738). 
7. In a broader sense, technical knowledge may also include factual knowledge about matters of technical 
interest. This narrower sense refers to kno\\ing techniques or know how. 
8. In the applied setting, budget guidelines must also be commands, that is, issued \\ith the coercive power 
of the governn1ent or, at least, the authority of an administrative hierarchy behind them. They are 
instructions to act, not merely rules of a game. 
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